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thereof, the court may authorize the executor or adminiRtrator to continue the operation of the decedent's business
to such an extent and subject to such restrictions as may
seem to the court to be for the best interest of the estate
and those interested therein."
[2] Defendant contends that since an executor authorized
under this section to operate a decedent's business no longer
does so at his own risk, he is not liable for torts committed
in the course of business operations when he is free from
fault, and that to construe the section otherwise would impose too heavy a burden on executors who must operate businesses. This contention overlooks not only the fact that the
executor is not required to operate the business, but must
petition the court for permission to do so, but the fact that
the rule as to the personal liability of an executor for torts
committed during the course of his administration is not confined to cases in which the executor carries on operations that
are outside the scope of his authority. (See Nickals v. Stanuy, nprG; RGpGporl v. Forer, nprG; 44 A.L.R. 637, 640')
Personal liability for torts committed during operations that
are otherwise within the proper scope of the executor's authority is not a new burden. There is nothing in section 572
to indicate that any change in the rule as to personal liability
was intended. The principal effect of the 1929 amendment
was to provide an authorization, should the will fail to provide one, for the executor to carry on the decedent'. business. (EstGfe of Ward, nprG; EsfGte of King, 19 Ca1.2d
354, 359 [121 P.2d 716].)
Defendant also contends that the rule of respOMBGt superior cannot be applied against an administrator or executor
who gains no personal advantage from the operation of a
decedent's business. In making this contention, defendant
relies on Campbell v. Bra.dbury, 179 Cal. 364,371 [176 P.
685] and J'effing v. Winch, 54 Ore. 660, 607 [104 P. 722,
21 Ann.Caa. 352, 38 L.R.A.N.S. 379]. In Campbell v. BrfUl..
bury, this court held that an incompetent under guardianship
was responsible for the negligent operation of an elevator in
a building operated under the control of the guardian and
rejected expressly any analogy to the liability of executors
in similar situations. A judgment imposing liability on an
incompetent to be paid out of assets controlled by a guardian
is clearly distinguishable from a judgment imposing liability
on an estate. The incompetent is a person and would still
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be liable after the discharge 01' removal of the guardian, but
the estate is not even a legal person and after distribution
of the assets and discharge of the executor it no longer exists.
The court in the Campbell case had someone before it upon
whom the liability could be imposed, and there is some justification for avoiding circuity of action by imposing the liability initial1y on the party that would ultimately bear it
even if the guardian were personally liable. The answer to
this problem by the Oregon court in Fetting v. Winch, aupra,
solves nothing except that a plaintiff would have no right
of recovery, no matter how just his case. In the Fetting case,
although the estate was still open, the court held that the
executor could be held in neither his individual nor his
representative capacity. He was not individually liable because not personal1y negligent, and the estate was not liable
because it could not commit a tort.
With regard to obligations incurred in tl.le operation of
businesses under section 572, it has been held that while the
administration continues, contractual obligations are properly
chargeable against the estate but do not become liens on the
assets of the estate. (Estate of Allen, 42 Cal.App.2d 346.
348 [l08 P.2d 973]; Estate of Smith, 16 Cal.App.2d 239.
241 [60 P.2d 574].) Defendant relies, however, on California
Employment Stab. Com. v. Hansen, 69 Cal.App.2d 757, 770
[160 P.2d 173], in which the court stated that the obligations incurred in managing the decedent's business pursuant
to section 572 are charges against. the estate and that after
a final decree of distribution the executor is not liable for
contributions under the Unemployment Insurance Act when
the claimant has failed to file a creditor's claim against the
estate. Not only was that case concerned with the construction of the Unemployment Insurance Act, but there was no
issue of fault on the part of the executor. Nor is it applicable
if the plaintiff has no provable and liquidated claim against
either the executor or the estate at the time the estate is closed.
[3] Under the doctrine of respondeat auperior, except
where the rule may have been changed by statute, torts committed by employees of a trustee in the course of administration of the trust estate subject the trustee to persona1liability.
(Rest., Trust, § 264, comment (b); cases collected, 3 (pt. 2)
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 532; 2 Scott on Trusts, § 264;
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1122, 1124.) Most cases have recognized
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that the same rules determine the personal liability of an
executor for torts committed in the course of administration.
(See Kirchner v. Muller, 280 N.Y. 23, 28 [19 N.E.2d 665,
127 A.L.R. 681); Clauson v. Stull, 331 Pa. 101, 103 [200 A.
593]; cases collected 43 Dick L.Rev. 143; 44 A.L.R. 637. 640:
3 (pt. 2) Bogert. op. cit. supra, 533.) Except for the Oregon
ease of li'etti""g v. Winch, supra, the cases hold that the doe·
trine of resptmdeat superior is applicable to an executo!'
and that he is personally liable for the torts of employees.
(Fisher v. McNeeley, 110 Wash. 283, 284 (188 P. 4'78, 14
LL.R. 369]; Gatti-Mcquade Co. v. Flyn"", 79 Misc. 430. 431
[140 N.Y.S. 135]; Kalua v. Camari""os, 11 Hawaii 557. 558;
see Bogert, Zoc. cit. supra.)
The rule of personal liability of a trustee or executor for
the torts of his agents in the course of administration is now
generally qualified by giving the executor or trustee a right
to reimbursement against the assets of the estate when he is
personally without fault. (Rest., Trusts, § 247; cases collected 3 (pt. 2) Bogert, op. cit. supra, § 734; Scott, op. cit.
supra, § 247; 44 A.L.R. 637. 676.) The restatement also pro·
vides that when the claim against the trustee is uncollectible
because his personal assets are insufticient, the plaintiff may
reach the trust assets to the extent that the trustee would
have had a right of reimbursement. (Rest.• Trust. § 268:
see, also, Scott on Trusts, § 268; Stone, A Thetw1J of Liabilify

of Trust Estates for the COfI.tracts and Toris of the Trustee,

I

22 Columb.L.Rev. 527.) A few cases have gone further and
allowed the trustee to be used in his representative capacity
in order to avoid circuity of action. (In re Raybould (1900).
1 Ch. 199, 201; Ewifl.g v. Wm. L. Foley, Inc., 115 Tex. 222,
234 [280 S.W. 499. 44 A.L.R. 627]; contra, Kirch""er v. Muller, supra.) None of these authorities, however, holds that the
trustee is absolved from personal liability (see Stone, toc. cit.
supra), and it is elear that any right of action that the plain.
tiff has against the estate is purely a derivative one.
['1 When the executor carries on the decedent's business
with proper authorization. there is no doubt that contractual
obligations properly incurred are chargeable against the
estate and that tort liability, where the executor is not personally at fault. should ultimately be home by the estate. If
section 572 has any effect on the question of tort liability of
the estate, the purpose of that section as well as the pUl'Pose
of any authorization in the will for the ea.rrying on of the
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business may be fully carried out by applying the rules
of the Restatement of Trusts in regard to such liability as
well as the representative's rights of reimbursement out of
the assets of the estate.
[5] It has been contended, however, that the doctrine of
respondeat superior should apply directly against the executor in his representative capacity and not subject him to personal liability when he is without fault. Although this precise
question has never previously been decided by the California
courts, there are good reasons for not departing from the general rule. To hold the estate rather than the executor primarily liable for the torts of the agents of the estate, it would
be necessary to apply the rules governing the liabilities of a
corporate office!" and to abandon those governing a trustee,
which have heretofore been held applicable to executors. It
is clear that an offieer of a corporation is not liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the torts of corporate employees except where the officer is at fault. The liability falls
upon the corporation. Unlike a corporation, however, an
estate is not a legal or corporate entity (Tanner v. Best, 40
Cal.App.2d 442, 444 [104 P.2d 1084]) and cannot be a principal. [6] Nor can the executor properly be regarded as
the agent of the heirs or distributees, for his authority is
derived from the will. and the control that is exercised over
him is the control exercised by the probate court. (Eustace v.
Jahns, 38 Cal. 3, 22.) His position is more nearly that of a
trustee or of the decedent himself than that of an agent. The
employees are thus regarded as his employees and his liability
for their actions should be that of any employer. (Kalua v.
Camarinos. 11 Hawaii 557, 558.)
[7] Moreover. even if it be assumed possible by some
procedure to hold the estate directly liable for the torts of
employee.q without any right against the executor personally,
where the executor is not personally at fault, there are practical objectiorm to such a procedure. Under the existing system of administration such a procedure would not afford the
heirs adequate protection. The only method available for
reaching the assets of the e.crtate is an action against the executor in his representative capacity. (Golden Gate Undertaking Co. v. Taylor: 168 Cal. 94, 99 r141 P. 822, Ann.Cas. 1915D
742, 52 hR.A.N.S. 1152]; Tanner v. Best, supra.) If the plaintiff could recover directly from the estate in an action against
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the executor in his representative capacity, the heirs would
have no assurance that the question of the personal fault
of the executor would be properly tried. It would not be to
the interest of either the plaintiff. who would be attempting
to recover out of the assets of the estate, or the defendant,
whose interest as an individual and as an executor would be
in con1lict (see KirchMr v. Muller. 280 N.Y. 23. 28 [19
N.E.2d 665, 127 A.L.R. 681]), to show personal fault on the
part of the executor. Under the general rule that the execu.
tor is personally liable for the torts committed by him or his
agents in the course of administration, the plaintiff may r&cover a judgment against the executor personally and the
question of the executor's fault is determined in the probate
court, where the interest of the heirs may properly be pro..
tected. (See Atkinson on Wills, 611.)
It is contended that this application of the respondeat
superior doctrine may have harsh results if the executor is
not able to recover against the estate and his own property
is !fIlbject to execution under the judgment. Ordinarily, if
the executor is without fault he is protected by his right of
reimbursement out of the assets of the estate. Moreover, this
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior is no
harsher than its usual application to a principal who may
gain no profit from the actions of his agent (Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal.2d 762. 775 [97 P.2d 7981) and there
is no estate from which he can get reimbursement. The prin.
cipal justification for the application of the doctrine of re8pcmdeat superior in any ease is the fact that the employer may
spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof
as part of his costs of doing business. (See Smith. Frolic and
Detour, 23 Columb.L.Rev. 444. 456 et seq.) Under the broad
power granted to the probate court under section 572 of the
Probate Code, the court may require. as a condition to the
right to continue decedent's business, the executor to insure
against any tort liability arising out of the conduct of the
business, with the premiums for such insurance payable out
of the assets of the estate as a proper expense of the business.
[8] In the present ease, even if there were either a direct
or derivative right against the executor in his representative
capacity, defendant Long could not be held liable in that
capacity, for he was no longer an executor and there was no
estate for 1Um w represent at the time of the suit. The pur-
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pose of such a suit is to !'each thl:! assets of the estate under
the executor'p control. (GoMen Gate Undertaking Co. v.
Taylor, supra; see Sterret v. Barker, 119 Cal. 492, 494 [51
P. 695].) Where the executor has been discharged and the
estate diRtributed. the executor ill therefore no longer RUbject
to RUit in his representative capacity. (Union Satlings Bank
v. De Laveaga, 150 Cal. 395. 398 [89 P. 84].) There would
be no purpose in mch a suit. for the executor bas no assets
of the estate under hil'l control.
(9] Similarly. after an executor bas been removed, his
connection with the estate is severed and a judgment against
him doe.'~ not bind the estate. (J/ore v. More, 127 Cal. 460,
462 f59 P. 8231.)
[10] In thifl case. therefore. the plaintiff could proceed
directly against the assetfil of the estat.e only by suing the
diRtributee. Thill action wall originally instituted against the
distributee as well as a~ainst the executo1'8, but a demurrer
was sustained without leave to amend. and a judgment, which
has now become final. wall entered in favor of the distributee.
Since the distrihutee is not a party to thill appeal. it cannot
be decided in this ('.aBe whether the executor has a right of
indemnity againm the distributee to the extent of the as.qets
distrihuted. (See Rest., Trusts. §§ 249(2) and 279 for t.he
restatement rules as to the tru.qtee'R right of indemnity after
distribution and the derivative rightA of a tort plaintiff.)
[11] The suggestion that a plaint.iff Flhould have onl:v a
direct. right against the diRtributee after an estate haFl heen
closed and the assetR distribut.ed is completely Ull.omppol'ted
by authoriiy. Moreover, such a rule would impose a considerable burden on the plaintiff in a case in which the assetA
are widely distributed among many legatees. who may all be
residents of other juril'ldjctions and have no property within
thiq state. There are not. therefore. sufficient reasons for deviating from the general rule of pe1'8onal liability of the executor for the tort.Q of himself and his agentR in the course of
adminiortration. and it is clear t.hat in closing the estate an
executor does not thereby cut off his pe1'8onal liability for
such torts
[1J] Althol1~h oefendant Long could have been held personally liahle for the injuries sustained by the plaintift' in
this caRe. thE' Question remains whether he was denied a fair
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trial on the issue of his personaJ liability. The theory of
the plaintiff's case against defendant was that he was a
business invitee on the premises operated by the defendant
and that the falling of the door was caused either by the
negligence of an employee of the garage in repairing the
door or by the failure of the garage employees to discover
a dangerous condition that might have been discovered by
reasonable inspection. Although there was some conflict in
the evidence as to plainti1l"s right to be on .the premises at
the time of the accident and as to his right to operate the
door, there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that his status was that of a busines..~ invitee and that
he had the right to open the door.
The basis for the theory that the accident occurred because
of the negligence of an employee in repairing the door was
the failure of an employee named Budhi, the building superintendent, to have a nut welded on the end of the wire cable.
The cable was replaced shortly before the accident (the exact
date was never established), by a carpenter employed by the
codefendant, the San Diego Planing Mill Company. This
carpenter, who had also iriginally installed the door, testified
that he did not tie the end of the wire cable to prevent it
from unwinding, as required by the instructions that came
with the original hardware. There was, therefore, sufficient
evidence to warrant an inference that the cable became dill.
connected because of unwinding of the cable. The carpenter
testi1ied that he did not tie the cable because at the time of
the original installation Budhi had had a nut welded to the
end of the cable, and on replacing the cable the carpenter
understood that this welding was to be done again. There
was evidence to the effect that such welding tended to weaken
the cable and that, for this reason, it was not done on similar
doors in San Diego. Budhi testi1ied that he did not have anything done to the door because the carpenter informed him
that it was unnecessary. This testimony was corroborated
by another witness. There was therefore so1Bcient evidence
upon which the jury might have concluded that the accident :
was caused by the negligence of the employees of either of
the defendants or of neither. (See J ohmton 'f. Long, 56 Cal.
App.2d 834, 837 [133 P.2d 409], for the law of the ease
88 to the liability of the defendant planing mm.)
The other ground on which defendant may have been held i
liable was the failure on the part of the garage employees,

I
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to use reasonable care to discover a condition that involved an
unreasonable risk of harm to those using the door. (Rest.,
Torts, § 343; Barbieri v. Law, 209 Cal. 429, 433 [287 P.
464] .) The end!l of the cable were not properly tied, and the
evidence WWI sufficient to warrant an inference that this con·
dition was the cause of the cable's becoming unfastened.
Although there was evidence that the accident might not
have happened had plaintiff opened the door in a proper
manner. the questions of causation and of contributory neg·
ligence were submitted to the jury under proper instruc~
tions, and there is substantial evidence that a reasonable
inspection would have disclosed 8 condition involving an
unreasonable risk .of harm to anyone operating the door.
[13] Defendant contends that the court erred in giving the follo,ving instruction:
"It was the duty of the defendant Ralph C. Long, to use
ordinary care and diligence in keeping in repair the meehan· .
ism and appliances maintained by said defendant for the use
of the passageway, and if you find from a consideration of
all the evidence that the accident resulting in the injuries to
plaintiff occurred by reason of a defect in said mechanism, or
appliances, and find that such defect either was known or,
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known to
the defendant Ralph C. Long, prior to the happening of the
accident then you will find said Ralph C. Long to have been
negligent with reference thereto, and if you further find
that. without negligence on the part of plaintiff, such negli.
genee was a proximate cause of the accident in question, your
verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff and against the de·
fendant Ralph C. Long."
It is defendant's position that since this instruction does
not mention the status of the plaintiff, the jury was instructed
that as a matter of law Long was liable whether or not the
jury concluded that plaintiff was an invitee. There is no
merit whatever in this contention, for the instruction complained of was read to the jury along with the instructions
on the question of plaintiff's status. The paragraph immediately preceding the foregoing quotation makes it clear that
the instruction complained. of· was given to the jury with
reference to plaintiff's duty to a business invitee. Two sen·
tence..~ above the matter quoted the court stated, "you are
instructed that where one as an i1tvitee is lawfully using an
entry or passageway. he is not required to employ any ex·
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traordinary degree of care or circumspection for the ascer·
tainment of whether or not the entry or passageway is safe."
(Italics added.) The sentence immediately preceding the
challenged instruction explains that a business invitee. if not
himself negligent, has a right to rely on the presumption that
the passageway is maintained in a proper and safe condition.
The instruction complained of then goes on to explain the
defendant's duty to such an invitee.
Following the paragraph complained of, the trial court
again referred to the duties of the defendant to an invitee.
The next paragraph makes clear what the jury was told by
these instructions. It reads as follows:
"You will note that there are two questions to consider in
connection with whether plaintiff received injuries as a result
of lack of care on the part of the proprietor or proprietors of
said building. The first question is with reference to his
status upon the premises and he must prove that he was an.
invitee in order to establish that he was a person toward whom
reasonable care must be exercised. It is then to be determined whether it has been established that the proprietor of
said premises failed to use ordinary care or negligently failed
to use ordinary care and whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." (Italics added.)
[14] Defendant also contends that the court held as a
matter of law that defendant was the proprietor of the busi.
ness. The instructions continue, however, as follows: "It is.
therefore, an essential element of plaintiff's cause of action
against the defendant. Ralph C. Long. to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Ralph C.
Long, was a proprietor of said building." (Italics added.l
Following this instruction there is an instruction that Long
is not liable as an executor. The rule of respondeat S'Uperior
is then explained to the jury. There was clearly no errol' in
referring to defendant as a proprietor oi the business. for,
as an executor authorized to run the business, he wa..q liable
as the proprietor.
[15] The second instruction complained of by defendant
reads as follows: "You are instructed that if the defendant
Ralph C. Long by and through his officers or agents, requested
the defendant Planing Mill Company to repair the door. and
if tke evidence establishes that said Long paid therefor, then
the law imputes to said Long knowledge of the condition and
necessity of repair." (Italics added.) Petitioner contends

)
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that by this instl'liction, the triaJ court, in effect, "instructed
the jury, as a matter of law, that if a bill was rendered for
the repain upon the door and was paid by long the full
knowledge of the condition was imputed to Long as a matter
of law." The instruction, however, merely informed the jury
that Long was liable for the acts of his agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that their knowledge of the
condition of the door at the time of the repain was imputed
. to him. By paying the bill for the repairs, Long merely
ratified the agency in getting the repairs done. In any event.
defendant Long, as an executor of the estate authorized to
run the business, W&!1 liable for the negligencp. of the employees of the estate in regard to the condition of the door.
Whether or not he paid the bill himself was therefore immaterial. For this reason the instruction was at most irrelevant
and could not have been prejudicial.
[16] Defendant also contends that the court erred in
refusing to give the fol1owing instruction requested by defendant Long:
"In considering the question of whether a person entering the premises of another is an invitee, you are instructed
that a person .entering premises or having authority to
enter premises for busineBll purposes becomes an invitee in
the premises to the extent reasonably necessary for· carrying
on the business purposes. The fact, however, that a penon
is such an invitee does not make him an invitee to all parts
of the premises, nor does it make him an invitee for the
purpose of using any and al1 appliances that may be on
the premises. In such instance he is an invitee only to the
extent reasonably to be expected in connection with the
business purposes for which he is invited to enter the premises. Such invitation implies the right to enter such portions
of the premises and to make use of su~h appliances therefor as are reasonably to be expected in connection with the
purpose of the invitation but no further."
Defendant makes the following concession in his opening
brief: "It has been at all times conceded that for the pur-pose of delivering gasoline· he [plaintiff] was an invitee."
Defendant's only claim of error, therefore, is that the jury
was not properly instructed as to the scope of the invitation
and as to the burden of proof thereon. The questions of
fact for the jury, as heretofore stated, involved plaintiff's
right to be on the premises at the time of the accident
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and his right to operate the door. The instructions given
by the trial court presented these issues to the jury, and
the jury was properly instructed in regard to the burden
of proof. Therefore the trial court did not err in refusing
defendant'!! requested instruction.
The court instructed the jury as to the status of an invitee in the following terms:
"One who goes upon the premises of another as a business
visitor at the express or implied invitation of the owner or
occupant, and in connection with some mutual business interest with the occupant or with the latter's own business, is
called in law :'Tl invitee. You are to determine whether the
plaintiff Johnsrun was or was not an invitee upon the premises
and for the use thereof, at the time and place of the happening of the accident." (Italics added.)
The court also instructed the jury with respect to the duty
of a proprietor to a business invitee and then stated, "You
will note that there are two questions to consider in connection with whether plaintiff received injuries as a result of lack
of care on the part of the proprietor or proprietors of said
building. The first question is with reference to his status
upon the premises and he must prove that he was an invitee
in order to establish that he was a person toward whom reasonable care must be exercised." (Italics added.) The jury
was properly instructed as to the meaning of the requirement
that the plaintiff must prove the material elements of his case.
The jury was further instructed "that where without negligence on his part a person is injured while lawfully using an
entry or passageway upon which he is a business invitee, and
where such injuries thus received come as a proximate result
of any negligence on the part of the party charged with the
maintenance of such entry or passageway, the injured party
is entitled to recover.
"Toward an invitee, he who extended the invitation, express or implied, is obligated to refrain from active negligence and to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a
condition reasonably safe for the invitee in the reasonable
pursuit of tJ purpose embraced within the invitation." (Italics
added..)
The jury was instructed in effect that it was a question of
fact for it to determine whether plainti1f had a right to operate the door, i.e., whether plaintiff was lawfully using the
doorway in the reasonable pursuit of the purpose embraced

)
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within the invitation. It was explained to the jury thatplaintiffs had alleged "that with the knowledge and acquiesence of
defendants and for the purpose of making . . . deliveries of
gasoline he was accustomed to enter the garage building
through a large overhead lift type of door." The jury was
instructed that defendant Long denied this and other allegations of plaintiff. They were also told that the codefendant
planing mill claimed that the automobile company "did not
at any time, invite the plaintiff or other persons than its own
servants, employees and agents to use said door, or any apparatus connected therewith...."
The instruction requested by defendant Long would have
presented the last issue more clearly to the jury, but since
the issues referred to in that instruction were adequately
presented to the jury in other instructions, it was not error
to refuse defendant's instruction.
AJthough tht're was sufficient evidence to sustain a judgment against defendant Long personally, the evidence was
conflicting, and the question remains whether there were any
errors committed during the course of the trial that may
have prejudiced defendant by leading the jury to reach its
verdict on some ground other than the evidence. Defendant
contends that the court erred in submitting to the jury a
form of verdict that was bound to be confusing and in ruling
on the right to sue defendant as executor after the estate
was closed, and that the effect of these errors was to cause
the jurors to believe that by returning a verdict "against
defendant Ralph C. Long, an individual acting as executor
of the estate of C. A. Gray, deceased," they were imposing
a liability upon the defendant that would ultimately be borne
by the estate and not by Long as an individual.
[17] The verdict in question was submit.ted to the jury
at plaintiff's request, and it was the only form of verdict
submitted with regard to the liability of defendant Long. The
trial court refused defendant's request to have the verdict
clarified by the jury. Defendant contends that this was error
on the ground that the verdict is too vague and uncertain to
support a judgment against defendant Long. The verdict,
however, is "against defendant Ralph C. Long" and the
phrase "an individual acting as executor of the estate of C. A.
Gray, deceased" is on its face merely descriptive. The verdict may be modified by eliminating this description. (See
St. Mary's HospitaZ v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 340 [92 P. 864];
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Kirchner v. 1IIuller, 280 N.Y. 23, 28 [19 N.E.2d 665, 127 A.L.R.
681].) [18] Defendant invoked a statement made by the
foreman of the jury and an afHdavit of another juror, to show
that the jury understood that the verdict was given against
Long in his representative capacity. A verdict may be impeached by the jury, however, only by a showing that it was
arrived at by chance. (To0m8s v. Nunes, 24 Cal.App.2d 395,
399 [75 P.2d 94]; Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. etc. Co., 125 Cal.
SOl, 505 [58 P. 169]; see 23 Cal.L.Rev. 218.)
[19] Defendant contends that it is apparent from the
record that the jurors were confused by the form of the
verdict and that certain other alleged errors during the
trial led them to return a verdict in the belief that it was
against the estate and that liability thereunder would be
borne by the distributee and not by Long. Defendant's claim
of prejudice is based on an analogy to the prejudice involved in informing a jury that a defendant in a personal
injury action carries liability insurance.
It cannot be disputed that there was considerable confusion on the part of counsel for both parties and on the part
of the trial judge as to the nature of the liability of an executor for the torts of an employee of an estate, particularly
when the estate is closed before the action is brought. It does
not follow, however, that the confusion was communicated
to the jury, for most of the discussion of the nature of Long's
liability occurred in the absence of the jury.
The theory of plaintift's right to sue Long in a representative capacity presented at the trial was that although the
estate had been closed, Long was liable as an individual acting as an executor, a vague status that apparently includes
his capacity both as an individual and as an executor. It was
contended that the verdict and judgment should describe
both capacities because defendant Long had a right of reimbursement out of the assets of the estate and that if it was
error so to describe defendant Long, this court, on appeal,
should modify the judgment in accord with its view of the
law. "We must sue the executor and we must sue him as
an individual but we do not sue him as Long. We sue him
as Ralph C. Long, the individual, who is the executor." It
was claimed that this was necessary because "he is not individually responsible" and the estate will ultimately have the
burden of any judgment against him. This theory, however,
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presented to the jury, and it cannot therefore be
on to show that the jury was prejudiced against
defendant Long.
~rot!,; The record indicates, however, that in the presence of the
. , panel but before any of the prospective jurors were
~'1l1inplLDellec1, plaintiff'. counsel made certain statements that
have been made in the jury'. presence. In reply
queiStiCln by defendant's counsel as to whether plaintiff
['eODllliderec:l the action against Long as one against him perl:ftiorwiAllV. eounse1 for plaintiff stated' that the situation is,.
sue the executor individually and' that underthe dictum of the cases that we have, and certainly
~~lDd4ar the just rule-that obligation of the individual is
i~nr:lSftlm~ to the estate, eventually." In answer to aquesthe trial court as to whether the plaintiff had atE'tamDted to charge the executors (Long and Verheyen) "with
.~.bi!lity as individuals in a capacity other than as executors
the EiState" counsel replied that he didn't know. "But
only trying to say that the business is operated by them
that under the law we do just what your Honor has
strange as it might be, we sue them individually because
are running the business and apparently the circuitous
'ati'proacb is this: That if they incur this liability, and they
incurred it not because of any misfeasance of their own,
'are entitled to recover from the estate." At the time
IIl"Jttll",,,, statements were made defendant Long made no objecthat they were prejudicial but merely questioned the
~i'rEiCtIIless of plaintiff's view of the law that the liability
directly or indirectly that of the estate.
pejtenc1aJlt claims that the statements constituted misconCOl;LWIlel and urges this alleged misconduct as a ground
r'j~v4~l'8IILl. having called the trial court's attention to the
character of the statements in an affldavit in
of his motion for a new trial. Since defendant
'DO objection to the statements at the time they were
'and answered them on their merits, he waived any
, to claim that they constituted misconduct. If the statewere prejudicial, defendant should have called the
cOurt'. attention thereto by a proper objection at the
they were made, thus giving the trial court an opporto avoid any possible claim of prejudice by disehargjury panel and having the jury selected from a new
that had not heard the remarks. (See Hicka v. Ocea.
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Shore Railroad, Inc., 18 Cal.2d 773, 787 [117 P.2d 8501;
Estate of Golden, 4 Cal.2d 300, 309 [48 P.2d 962]; cases collected 108 A.L.R. 756, 757.) Nor can defendant rely on these
statements to show that any error committed during the
subsequent course of the trial resulted in prejudice. Since
defendant's counsel was willing at the time to discuss in the
presence of the jury panel the question of the nature of the
executor's liability, he contributed to any prejudice that may
have resulted from this discussion. In any event, this discussion took place 'before the impaneling of the jury, and those
members of the panel who later became jurors in this ease
had not yet been advised of the nature of the case they were
to decide. It is doubtful whether they followed the remarks
of counsel. Moreover, at the close of the trial, the jurors
were instructed that they were not to consider any statements
of counsel occurring during the course of the trial.
The defendant also contends that the error committed by
the trial judge in ruling that Long was subject to suit in a
representative capacity contributed to the alleged confusion
arising from the form of the verdict. After the jury was
impaneled and at the commencement of the trial of the case,
defendant Long objected to the introduction of any testimony
against him in a representative capacity. The trial court
overruled the objection. This ruling was made in the jury's
presence, but there was no discussion at that time of the
nature of Long's liability. The matter was subsequently discussed in the absence of the jury, and the trial judge again
ruled that Long could be used as an executor. The same
ruling Was made on defendant's motion for a directed verdict. .but the jury was not present and could not have
been prejudiced by the ruling.
The only basis for the claim that the rulings in question
constituted prejudicial error is the fact that after the first
ruling defendant Long thereafter defended the case in both
capacities. It is true that this served to call the jury's attention to the fact that defendant Long had been an executor
of the estate, but obviously it was necessary for the jury to
be informed of this fact, for the very basis of the case against
Long was that he had been one of the executors at the time
the injury occurred. Even if it be assumed that the effect
of the erroneous ruling of the trial court was to place an
added and unnecessary burden on defendant Long to defend the ease in a nonexistent capacity, it does not follow
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that the jury assumed that any judgment against Long
would have to be paid by the estate that he was supposed to
represent. If the jury made this assumption it was in the
face of a clear and correct instruction to the contrary. The
trial court instructed the jury as follows: "You are further
instructed that under the laws of the State of California
no action may be maintained against the estate of C. A.
Gray or against the defendant. Ralph C. Long, in his capacity as an Executor of said estate. As to the defendant,
Long, the action which is submitted to you for determination is against him as an individual. The two defendants,
therefore, involved in this action are Ralph C. Long and
San Diego Planing Mill, a corporation."
At another point in the instructions the court reminded
the jurors that they were not concerned with the liability
of the estate or of Long as an executor. They were informed
that their attention had been "called to the fact that the
estate of C. A. Gray, deceased, is not, under the law of this
state, answerable to the plaintiff in this action. An executor
of an estate who operates a business is answerable, if at all,
as an individual." In view of these instructions, it cannot
be assumed that the jury believed that the judgment was
against Long in any capacity other than as an individual or
that any liability that might result from their verdict would
be borne by anyone but Long.
Defendant contends, however, that these correct instructions may not be relied on to sustain the jury's verdict because the jurors were also instructed that if the codefendant
planing mill was negligent and this negligence combined
with the negligence, if any, "of the defendant Ralph C. Long.
as an individual and executor, to proximately cause said injury . . ., then your verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff
and against all defendants." This instruction, by itself. might
be underStood as informing the jury that Long could be
held liable as an executor and as an individual. but in view of
the instruction that he could not be sued as an executor and
that the only defendants involved in the action were Ralph
C. Long and San Diego Planing Mill, it may not be assumed
that the jury so interpreted this instruction. When the three
instructions are considered together, it is apparent that the
jury was correctly instructed that the two defendants in this
case were Long as an individual and the codefendant planing
mill; that neither the estate nor Long as an executor was
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subject to suit; that if a verdict were returned against Long
it would be because he was answerable for the accident as an
individual i and that if the negligence of an employee of the
planing mill combined with the negligence of an employee
of the estate to cause the accident. then both Long as an
individual and the planing mill would be liable. Whether or
not the confusion among counsel and the trial court as to the
nature of the tort liability of an executor after his discharge
was unavoidable. it is apparent from the record that aside
from the statements of plaintiff's counsel in the presence of
the jury panel, which were waived by defendant, there was
nothing presented to the jurors that may be used to show
that the erroneous ruling and the form of the verdict resulted
in confusing them to such an extent that they returned a
verdict based on prejudice rather than upon the evidence
before them.
[20] Defendant contends that the jury's verdict award·
ing plaintiB $87,575 is plainly excessive in view of the fact
that about $73,000 of that sum constituted general damages.
The verdict is undoubtedly high. Nevertheless, it is not the
function of a reviewing court to interfere with a jury's award
of damagee 1U11ess it ",. 80 grossly disproportionate to any
reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the factll that
it shocks the court's sense of justice and raises a presumption
that it was the result of passion and prejudice. (Z",'bbeZZ v.
8outh6na Pacific 00., 160 Cal. 237. 255 rU6 P. 5131.) The
amount of the verdict must be viewed. in the light of the
evidence before the trial court. (Zibb6ll v. 80uthern PlJCifiic
00., IUpt'CI, at 254.) The trW court. in denying a motion for
new trial, found that the verdict was not excessive. This
decision lends weight to the jury's award. (Birifl,ger v. 81JCr(J"""to Lodge No.6, 187 Cal. 578. 585 [203 P. 768]; Me8weeMfI v. EMf BtJfI TraMt 00., 60 Cal.App.2d 807. 814
[141 P.2d 787}.) There is considerable support in the evi·
dence for the trial court's approval of the amount awarded.
It would aeeomplish no purpose to recite all the evidence
relating to plaintitf'8 injuries. It may be noted, however,
that for a period of over four years he has undergone thirty·
one operations for the purpose of alleviating bis disfigurement and he faces additional operations. The accident reno
dered him 80 un.crightly that it would be unreasonable to expect
him to forego restorative surgery. His doctors were highly
quali1ied in plastic surgery, and thq wormed the tarT .~
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length of the steps already taken to repair, in slight measure,
the damage to his appearance. The operations were complicated and painful. Many of the operations consisted of the
raising of pedicles from various parts of his body and attaching them first to parts of his face and then to his nose. This
procedure was repeatedly unsuccessful, each attempt requiring new removals of substantial amounts of skin and flesh.
For over four years plaintiff has spent a large part of his
time in the hospital. It is difficult t.o predict how many remaining operations may be necessary.
Defendant concede.q that plaintiff is "very considerably
disfigured" and the likelihood is that he always will be. Since
plaintiff is a salesman a.q well as a truck driver, ,he has suffered a substantial loss in earning capacity. A reviewing
court does not ordinarily substitute its judgment for that
of the jury and trial court, which have evaluated in terms
of damages the pain, humiliation. disfigurement, and loss of
earning capacity suffered by a plaintiff. (Kelley v. Hodge
Transportation System, 197 Cal. 598, 610 T242 P. 76].) In
view of the extensive testimony concerning plaintiff's medical history and the uncertainty of his future restoration,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in its refusal
to grant a new trial or to reduce the award on the ground
of excessive damages.
Defendant, in reliance upon Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal. 46,
also contends that the cost of plastic surgery was' improperly allowed as a measure of damages. In the Karl' case,
decided in 1872. plaintiff sued to recover for services rendered and expenses incurred in the cure of wounds inflicted upon his infant daughter. Much of the expense was
the result of surgical treatment for the removal of an unsightly disfigurement caused by the injury. This court held
that any restoration undertaken by plaintiff was voluntary
and could not be an element of damages in an action on
his behalf. There were indications in the ease that the infant had previously optained a recovery based on the continuance of her deformity.
Any expressions in the Karl' case to the e1Iect that an injured party is not entitled to damages in the form of expenses incurred for restorative surgery made necessary by
the negligence of defendant must be disapproved. (See Rest.,
Torts, § 924(c).) Present day standards no longer regard
plastic surgery as a strange or foreign art. Indeed, there may

)

78

JOHNSTON

v.

LONG

[30C.2d

be occasions when an injured person would be required to
undergo plastic surgery to mitagate damages. (Goodwin v.
Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103 [167 A. 87J.) In the present case
it was essential for plaintiff to undergo some restorative
surgery because of the impairment of his breathing caused
by the accident. It was also necessary to take steps to expedite the healing of the wound, which was retarded by a
lack of blood supply to the injured member.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-As 1 read the record, the form of the
verdict, combined with the erroneous rulings requiring Long
to defend as executor, was bound to lead to confusion and
undoubtedly gave the jury the impression that the judgment
would ultimately be paid by the estate and not by him.
I agree that the court could modify the verdict by regarding certain terms as descriptive, but it is quite certain that
the jury did not so regard them. This verdict may not be
impeached, but when its form is considered in connection
with the other errors throughout the trial, there iR a clear
record showing that, although it read against Long. in effect,
the jurors believed it to be an award of damageR against
the estate for which Long would be indemnified.
The statements of plaintiff'R counsel. made in the presence
of the jury, that the liability was directly or indirectly that
of the estate, should not be disregarded in determining
whether the other errors committed during the course of the
trial were prejudicial. At the time those statement.'I were
made, the trial judge had not yet ruled upon the question &..'1
to whether Long was properly sued in his representative
capacity. Shortly thereafter, Long objected to the introduction of any testimony against him in a representative capacity. The objection was overruled in the presencee of the
jury. Subsequently, the matter was argued by counsel in the
absence of the jury. Long then called attention to the prejudicial effect of a ruling requiring him to defend before the
jury in the dual capacity of an individual and an executor.
But the court decided that he could be sued 88 an executor,
evidently upon the theory of his ability in some form of
"individual representative capacity." This is evident from
the trial judge's statement that, although probably the estate
W88 not liable, Long could be sued 88 an executor aDd should
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------------------be described as an individual and as an executor in order

-)

to protect any right of recovery out of the assets of the estate.
This discussion did not take place in the jurors' presence, but
they were aware of the ruling upon the motion to the effect
that Long was properly sued as an executor. The effect of
this erroneous ruling was to force Long to defend as executor.
The prejudicial effect of these errors, according to thc
. plaintiff, was cured by a correct instruction that no action
, could be maintained against the estate or against Long in
his capacity as executor and that Long was liable only personally. The effect of that instnlction must be considered,
. however. in connection with the directly contrary rulings of
,the trial court. The jurors knew that the suit was prosecuted
'against Long in his capacity a.~ an executor and he had defended in that capacity. The instruction is entirely incon'sistent with the only form of verdict submitted to the jury
providing for a recovery against Long. Moreover, the in'&tructions themselves were inconsistent, for the court also
instructed the jury that if the codefendant planing mill
:Wa,s negligent. and its negligence combined with the negli'gence, if any, "of the defendant Ralph C. Long, as an in'dividual and executor, to proximately cause said injury . . .,
then your verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff and against
" "all defendants."
it was necessary for the jury to be inItformed of Long's service as an executor of the Gray estate,
there is no basis for an assumption, from that fact
that the executor would have a right of indemnity,
o~ that the liability was directly or indirectly that of the
estate. Nor was it necessary to submit to the jury a con.
form of verdict.
plaintiff takes the position that the errors were unv ....,.. /J.,,, because of the unsettled state of the law on the
of an executor. The basis of his contention is that
_:n""1:n,\1' the plaintiff nor the trial judge knew the nature of
executor's liability after the estate was closed because
question has not previously been decided by this court.
_Kn·......'.,...... the unsettled state of the law on any point which
the plaintiff and caused the trial court to comdoes not preclude Long from complaining of the
E'1>re;juolici:al effect of that error.
M(llreclve,r. even if it be assumed that the question of the
liliiability of the executors in his representative capacity was

)
/

80

JOHNSTON

v. LONG

[30 C.2d

so unsettled that it could not be determined by a trial court
and was properly left for initial determination on appeal,
there was no necessity to submit to the jury a form of verdict
that, together with the ruling of the trial court, would reasonably be understood by the jury as imposing some form of
liability against the estate. The least that could have been
done to mitigate the confusion and prejudice in the minds of
the jurors was to submit to them a verdict that could be
understood only as imposing liability against the executor
personally. Certainly the jury could have been instructed,
clearly and without conflict, that any award of damages
against Long was his personal obligation and not that of
the estate, either directly or indirectly. In that event, if it
were later determined upon appeal that the liability could
be imposed against the estate, no prejudice would have resulted to the plaintiff, because the ability to pay a judgment
has no relation to the question as to who is at fault.
The prejudicial character of the errors in this case is
analogous to the prejudice involved in allowing a jury to be
informed that a defendant in a personal injury action carries
liability insurance. {Schlenker v. Egloff, 133 Cal.App. 393,
398 [24 P.2d 224J; see Pierce v. United Gas ~ Electric Co.,
161 Cal.' 176, 188 [118 P. 700]; cases collected. 56 A.L.R.
1418; 105 A.L.R. 1319.} There is the same probability that
the jury would be more inclined to find a verdict against
Long if it believed he would be indemnified than if it understood that he would have to bear the burden alone. (See
Brown v. Yocum, 113 Cal.App. 621, 625 [298 P. 845].) Although there was no showing of bad faith, the errors, in SI)
far as they impressed the jury with the idea that the judgment against Long would be paid by the estate, were prejudicial and ground for reversal, because the question of defendant's responsibility was so close that a verdict in his
favor would have been at least equally reasonable (see Citti
v. Ba1Ja, 204 Cal. 136, 139 [266 P. 954]; Schlenker v. Egloff,
supra), and there is every reason to believe that the errors
substantially influenced the result.
It is contended that the errors were not prejudicial upon
the ground that the distributee will ultimately have to pay
the judgment, because plaintiff concedes that the record
shows no personal negligence of Long. Obviously, the distributee is not bound by the plaintiff's concession. It was
not necessarily to the interest of either the plaintiff or Long
to show personal negligence, and it eaDDOt be awame1 that
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the evidence in litigation to which the distributee was a
party would not show that Long, as executor, was personally
at fault, or that he violated some duty to the heirs that would
foreclose any right of indemnity. Also, since the distributee
is not a party to this appeal, the question of Long's right of
indemnity against the distributee cannot now be determined.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment should
be reversed.
Spence, J., I concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In liberal construction of section 572 of the Probate Code I would hold that in such a case
as this the executor should be liable exclusively in his representative capacity. When an executor conducts the business
of an estate under authorization of the court and the Probate Code he is not personally liable for the contract debts
and obligations incurred in carrying on such business. No
more, I think, should he, in the absence of personal fault,
be personally liable for torts of estate employees. His actions
.in the premises are purely in the capacity of executor. The
employee whose fault causes the injury to another is not the
employee of the executor personally. He is the employee of
the executor only in the latter's representative status. The
doctrine of respondeat superior, then, should pass the burden on to the real employer, to the executor in his representative capacity but not against him otherwise.
It is asserted that the law which holds that an officer of a
corporation is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat
Buperior for the torts of corporate employees except where the
officer is at fault, cannot be applied to executors; that the
corporate employee's liability can be related directly to the
corporation because the latter is an entity and can be sued,
but that the estate of a decedent is not an entity and cannot
be sued. I do not find this proposition persuasive. If the
estate of a decedent is enough of an entity to carry on a business, to contract and pay debts, and realize profits and losses,
it should be enough of an entity to be sued. In fact the books
are replete with cases in which estates, acting through the
executors or administrators, have sued and been sued. The
Probate Code (see §§ 572, 573 et seq. and Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 369) certainly authorizes such proceedings in relation to
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causes ex contractu. The question here is: Is this particular tort action authorized as against the executor in
his official capacity t
Section 572 (Prob. Code) declares that "the court may
authorize the executor . . . to continue the operation of the
decedent's business to such an extent and subject to such
restrictions as may seem to the court to be for the best
interest of the estate and those interested therein." The
operation of a business ordinarily includes participation as
a party plaintiff or defendant in such litigation as may
arise from normal conduct of the business. Tort actions
are not abnormal in the conduct of a business. Surely it
cannot be seriously asserted that a business such as that
here involved could be carried on for extended periods
without the definite possibility of tortious conduct of some employee; human experience demonstrates the contrary.
Of course, it is not intimated that the court in authorizing the conduct of the business intended to authorize the
commission of torts by employees. But the application of
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not depend on express or intentional authorization of tortious conduct. (16
Cal.Jur 1101-1102, § 61.)
It seems to me that the declaration in the majority opinion
that "If section 572 has any effect on the question of tort
liability of the estate, the purpose of that section as well asl
the purpose of any authorization in the will for the carrying!
on of the business may be fully carried out by applying th
rules of the Restatement of Trusts in regard to such liabili
[personal on the trustee] as well as the representative'R righ
of reimbursement out of the assets of the estate" is thor
oughly unrealistic, unwarranted and impractical. If it is
be recognized that the liability is ultimately and in justic
that of the estate, then that liability should be impose
directly on the estate rather than through the round-aOOu
method espoused in the opinion. The opinion says, in effect
that the nonnegligent executor is personally liable in legal'
istic form but not in actual substance because he may ulti
mately recover from the estate. Such method must inevitabl
tend to multiply litigation and often may result in leavin
a nonnegligent executor with the &etuality as well as the
form of personal liability.
Section 572 (Prob. Code) in its present substance is before us for initial construction in this case. We should not,1
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on this open question, evolve a construction which seems so
certain to produce multiplicity of suits, delays in final settlement of estates, and, at least occasionally, admittedly unjust actual responsibility, all stemming from the unrealistic
concept that authorization to an executor to conduct a business in his official capacity does not carry with it authorization to sue or be sued in the same capacity in respect to torts
committed in doing the very thing authorized.
The judgment in this case, as well as the verdict upon
which it is based, is in such form and substance as to warrant its construction as running against the defendant Long
solely as executor of the estate. So construed the judgment
could well be affirmed unless precluded by the facts that Long
had been discharged as executor and the estate proceedings
closed, and not reopened, prior to institution of the action.
The questions which would arise as to the competence of
Long to defend as executor without reopening the probate
proceedings, and as to the validity and enforceability of the
judgment, if construed as suggested, I do not here reach because discussion thereof, in view of the majority holding,
would be academic at this stage. The majority opinion construes the judgment as running against Mr. Long personally
and as so construed affirms it. In my view it should be construed, and can properly be affirmed if at all, only as against
Mr. Long as executor of the estate. If it cannot be affirmed
against him in his representative capacity then it should be
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Hence, regardless of what conclusion might be reached as
to Mr. Long's capacity t.o defend as executor and as to the
validity and enforceability of the judgment if construed to
bind him only in his representative capacity, I am compelled
to dissent from the majority's judgment and opinion.
A ppellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1947. and the opinion was modified to read as above. Edmonds, J_, Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.
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